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I.

INTRODUCTION

The law of restitution regulates a major area of litigation, but in Texas
and elsewhere, this law suffers from a significant degree of confusion.
Before becoming the reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
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Unjust Enrichment (Restatement (Third)), Andrew Kull noted how United
States lawyers and judges suffer from a misunderstanding of the law of
restitution.' That misunderstanding significantly affects litigation because
one cannot comprehensively describe the body of court-made rights and
remedies without including the law of restitution.2
These misunderstandings arise, in part, from the continued use of
terminology laden with ancient fictions. Like the law of torts and contracts,
the law of restitution imposes civil liability and provides distinctive
remedies to address that liability. Unlike torts and contracts, restitution has
not benefited from the general acceptance and simplification of the
definitions on which its concepts rest. The publication in 2011 of the
American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) should help to diminish this
uncertainty in the future.3 Nevertheless, litigators in many states, including
Texas, must continue to struggle through what remains an unnecessarily
mysterious body of law. This Article seeks in part to reduce that mystery
and to find the common themes in relevant Texas rulings.
The Texas Supreme Court appears to have adopted the modem view of
restitution, but its rulings lack the detailed guidance needed by lower courts.
This Article therefore concludes with suggestions that the Texas Supreme
Court should establish an independent and generally applicable cause of
action for unjust enrichment, describe clearly the elements of that cause of
action, and lend its authority to the modem terms that describe the law of
restitution. None of these suggestions requires a radical departure by the
Texas Supreme Court from what it has already established in restitution
cases.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION

Most state judicial systems began adjudicating private disputes by
using some part of the court-made law developed in the common law and
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; B.A., University of Texas at
Austin; J.D., L.L.M., University of Texas School of Law.
1.
2.

Andrew Kull, RationalizingRestitution, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 1191, 1195 (1995).
See id.

3.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011). The

American Law Institute describes its restatements in the following manner:
Restatements are addressed to courts and others applying existing law.
Restatements aim at clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements or

variations and reflect the law as it presently stands or might plausibly be stated by a
court. Restatement black-letter formulations assume the stance of describing the law as
it is.
AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR
ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 4 (2005), available at
http://www.ali.org/doc/StyleManual.pdf.
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equity courts of England. The two judicial systems that grew in Englandthe common law courts and those of equity-each created substantive law
and distinctive remedies.
The courts of the common law, for example, created the substantive
law of tort and contract, and the remedy characteristic of these causes of
action has long been the award of damages-a monetary judgment
measured by the plaintiffs losses. On the other hand, the common law
courts developed increasingly rigid procedural forms of action that imposed
limiting and strictly enforced requirements on pleading. The courts of
equity became established in England as an alternative forum and lawmaker
because of the rigidity of the common law forms of action and the problems
caused by the common law courts' use of a jury. The courts of equity
developed the law of trusts and mortgages and created their own unique
remedy-the injunction. The injunction provided an effective remedy when
damages were not helpful or adequate, and equity courts wielded the
powerful sanction of contempt to punish those who disobeyed their
injunctions.
As early as 1845, Texas merged the two systems represented by the
common law and equity courts. At least after that time, a Texas court could
apply any pertinent substantive law or remedy without regard to the system
from which it was derived.5 Texas courts also avoided the strict pleading
requirements that characterized the common law forms of action, but
adopted England's court-made law, either from the common law or equity
courts, as rules of decision unless these were inconsistent with the Texas
Constitution or with a Texas statute.6
Lawyers today often think of the common law as a reference to courtmade, as opposed to statutory, law. However, all of the rules and remedies
created in the common law and equity courts are court-made law in this
sense. Although the English court-made law pertaining to restitution
differed because of the characteristics and rationalizations of these two
court systems, both the common law and the equity courts created
substantive law to prevent unjust enrichment. In seeking to achieve this
substantive end, however, each applied its own distinctive remedies and its
own justifications for the expansion of its judicial power.

4.
5.

Michael Ariens, Lone Star Law: A Legal History of Texas 251 (2011).
See Rogers v. Daniel Oil & Royalty Co., 110 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. 1937); see also

Joseph Webb McKnight, The Spanish Influence on the Texas Law of Civil Procedure,38 TEX. L.
REv. 24, 31-32 (1960); Robert W. Stayton, Texas' Approaches to the Parker Ideal and Her

Shortcomings, 37 TEX. L. REv. 845, 845 (1959).
6. See Towner v. Sayre, 4 Tex. 28, 29 (1849); Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank of Austin, 505
S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'don othergrounds, 518 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1974);
see also McKnight, supra note 5, at 26.
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The Common Law and Quasi-Contracts

Rather than creating a right or obligation and then the judicial
procedure for its enforcement, the common law courts created substantive
law through the design of their procedures. In particular, their requirements
for pleading effectively described the rights and obligations that were
legally enforceable. By the seventeenth century, the common law courts had
developed their assumpsit form of action. This form of action initially
allowed suits and remedies only for the enforcement of express contracts,
but was subsequently extended to contracts inferred from the circumstances,
the so-called implied-in-fact contract. This "special" assumpsit form was
later expanded to authorize judicial enforcement of what had been the
action in debt, which became known as a claim in indebitatus assumpsit.8
Although a debt resembles a contract, the early rules treated it as a property
right and required the creditor to bring an action in debt in the Common
Pleas court where a plaintiff made his case subject to an odd method of
proof called the wager of law. 9 These expansions gave the common law
courts comprehensive power over what we know today as contract law.
In some cases, however, the defendant gained a benefit at the
plaintiffs expense but had not done so through a binding agreement. The
common law judges used their ingenuity to create legal fictions that
justified, or perhaps shielded, the expansion of their judicial authority over
these cases. For example, one who received money through a mistaken
payment by the plaintiff was made liable for a fictional debt, thus allowing
the common law courts to avoid the unjustified enrichment of a defendant
by imposing, as a matter of law, a promise to repay the debt.' 0 This fictional
promise to pay was then used to create a right resembling the right derived
from actual contracts. The manufactured similarity of these "quasicontracts" was deemed sufficient to fit such cases within the assumpsit form
of action, but the new actions were distinguished by being labeled general
11
assumpsit.
A plaintiff used general assumpsit to obtain restitution from a
defendant who unjustly held a benefit gained at the plaintiff's expense.
Restitution thus resembled the repayment of a debt, except the debt was a
7. See 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution § 4.2(3), at
579 (2d ed. 1993).
8.

See id. at 578-79.

9. See id. at 577. This Monty-Pythonesque method of proof depended on the ability of a
litigant to swear convincingly that the case against him was groundless. As it developed in
complexity, the wager required swearing by friends or associates of a party ("compurgators"). See
also Black's Law Dictionary 1574 (7th ed. 1999) (defining wager oflaw).
10. See 1 Dobbs, supra note 7, § 4.2(3), at 580.
11.

See id. at 579.
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creation of law rather than of the parties. In order to maintain the fiction, the
common law courts referred to this right of restitution as one derived from
implied-in-law quasi-contracts, which is a distinctly legal way of saying
that no true agreement of the parties existed. The common law's remedy for
"breach" of a quasi-contract was restitution-that is, the return of the
benefit unjustly held by the defendant. Restitution thus became a logical
response to a right of action based on preventing unjust enrichment.
More specific forms of action under assumpsit were developed for
particular fact patterns. As a group, these became known as the common
counts and could be divided into what were known as the debt or
indebitatus counts, or into the value counts.12 For example, the debt counts
included suits for money paid for the defendant's use or to the defendant.' 3
These included true contract cases as well as unjust enrichment cases.14
Under the value counts, plaintiffs could sue for the value of services or for
the value of goods provided to the defendant. The quantum meruit count
allowed recovery of the value of services provided, and quantum valebat
allowed recovery of the value of goods transferred to the defendant. 5 As
with the debt counts, the value counts included true contract claims and
restitution claims not based on contract.' 6
B.

The Equity Courts and Constructive Trusts

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the common law courts had
gradually become less flexible in accepting new forms of action for
emerging problems. The common law system also experienced problems in
particular cases because of its use of uneducated laymen on juries. 7 As the
common law courts began to provide less adequate relief, these limitations
fueled the rise of a separate court system known as the Court of Chancery,
which operated under the chief law member of the Kings' council, the
chancellor. 8 Once developed, this system became known as the courts of
equity.
One of the more significant substantive accomplishments of the equity
courts was their development of the law of trusts. Although trust law began
as a method of holding and transferring land, it developed into a body of
substantive and remedial laws designed to aid in the management of
12. See id. at 579-83.
13. See id. at 581-82.
14. Id. at 582.
15. Id. at 583.
16. See id. at 583-84.
17. See Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer et al., Equitable Remedies, Restitution and Damages
2 (8th ed. 2011).
18. Id. at 3.
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personal property as well. 19 In creating the law of express trusts, the courts
of equity used their principle of good conscience to require a trustee to do
what, in good conscience, he should.2 0 Trust law thus created a presumption
that protected the beneficiary by placing a burden of good faith on the
trustee. Although the trustee held legal title to trust assets and an everexpanding power over these assets, he was bound by the law as a fiduciary
to perform with loyalty and prudence. 2 1
The courts of equity were as adept as the common law courts at
expanding their judicial power. They did so in a similar fashion as well;
they used legal fictions to create superficial similarities between new rights
and more established rights. For example, the equity courts created their
constructive trust remedy to capture property purchased with trust funds by
a trustee.22 Later, they extended this injunctive remedy to bind parties who
had never agreed to a trust arrangement.23 As the common law courts had
reached beyond contracts to prevent unjust enrichment, the equity courts
used the constructive trust to accomplish the same purpose.24 They thus
captured property that was unjustly held by a defendant in the same way
they could retrieve property wrongly taken by a trustee. In this fictional
trust, the plaintiff was the beneficiary, and the unjustly enriched defendant
became the implied-in-law trustee.
III. OVERVIEW OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

A.

Cause ofAction to Prevent Unjust Enrichment

1.

Is "Unjust Enrichment" Too Vague?

One best understands restitution by viewing it as inextricably bound up
with a general right to prevent unjust enrichment. "Restitution is the law of

19.

See 1 Dobbs, supra note 7, §2.3(2), at 75.

20.

See id. at 77.

21. See John H. Langbein et al., History of the Common Law: The Development of AngloAmerican Legal Institutions 310 (2009).
22. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.008(a)(9) (West 2007) (stating that as one remedy
for a breach of trust, a court can "impose a lien or a constructive trust on trust property, or trace
trust property of which the trustee wrongfully disposed and recover the property or the proceeds
from the property").
23. See Hatton v. Turner, 622 S.W.2d 450, 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) ("A
constructive trust is not in reality a trust but is an equitable remedy against unjust
enrichment.... It is not necessary to the establishment of a constructive trust that an express or
conventional trust relationship shall exist between the parties, or that any promise shall have been
made by the one for the benefit of the other.").
24. See 1 Dobbs, supra note 7, § 4.3(2), at 590.
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nonconsensual [transfers of property] and nonbargained benefits . .. .,,25 It
protects property rights against those who have by accident or through
wrongdoing gained control over the money, property, or benefit in
controversy and have thus been unjustly enriched.
Although this Article argues for the adoption of the more
understandable modem terminology of unjust enrichment, some might
contend that uncertainty inheres in any effort to distinguish those
enrichments that are unjust from those that are not. In this respect, the
Restatement (Third) concedes that "unjustified" enrichment more
accurately describes restitution's actual focus. 26 "Unjustified enrichment is
enrichment that lacks an adequate legal basis; it results from a transaction
that the law treats as ineffective to work a conclusive alteration in
ownership rights."27 The Restatement (Third) retained unjust enrichment
because that usage has been "imposed by the first Restatement of
Restitution." 28 Nevertheless, a finding of unjust enrichment requires
examination of the justifications for that enrichment, and that effort is no
more unpredictable than a finding of negligence in a tort case. One
concludes that no justification exists for a particular enrichment through the
application of clarifying rules that arise from limiting principles and
specific defenses.29
As an example of this rule-based predictability, consider the limiting
principle that withdraws restitution from one who acts as volunteer.
Consider this to be Hypothetical 1. Suppose your client returned from a
vacation to discover that a house painter (the plaintiff) has painted her
house without permission and has billed her $5,000-the actual value added
to her house. If she refuses to pay, the plaintiff might sue your client for the
$5,000 benefit she currently enjoys at the plaintiffs expense, claiming that
your client has been unjustly enriched.
Even if the client has been enriched, the critical question is whether
retaining that (nonreturnable) benefit without compensating the plaintiff
would be unjust. Answering this question involves an identification of the
justifications for allowing her to keep the benefit without paying. First, your
client did not ask for the benefit and was not given the opportunity to reject

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. d (2011).
26. See id. § I cmt. b. In Comment b, the Restatement (Third) recognizes the greater
explanatory power of the phrase unjustified enrichment. This adjective more helpfully describes
the focus of liability for restitution by making clear the concern with an enrichment that lacks a
legal, rather than a moral, justification.
25.

27.

Id.

28. Id.
29. See generally id. §§ 62-67 (describing standard defenses to a claim in restitution and
related rules governing value and notice).
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it. Because the benefit is nonreturnable-in that she cannot peel the paint
off her house-she would be forced to incur a cost she might have deferred
if given the chance. Second, the plaintiff intentionally sought to place this
expense on your client by denying her right to engage in contractual
negotiation or to reject this arrangement. Finally, the plaintiff in this case
engaged in a wrongful action, trespass, in order to impose this benefit on
your client. The law of restitution speaks of this situation through a
shorthand label by denying a remedy to a "volunteer" or an "officious
intermeddler," but the analysis relies on specific rule-based justifications to
support or deny restitution.30
Under the law of restitution, Hypothetical I would be an easy case. A
harder case would arise if the plaintiff could prove the improvement was
made because of a mistake. 3 ' For example, assume the plaintiff painted the
wrong house believing it belonged to someone who had requested that
work. In this instance, the law recognizes an equitable justification on his
part, but his conferral of a nonreturnable benefit means his requested
remedy nevertheless results in an involuntary exchange, forcing the
defendant to pay for a benefit she did not request.32 In this harder case, a
court must decide who will prevail in a conflict between two innocent
parties, each having some justification for their position. That decision will
require some use of the court's equitable power and some resort to its sense
of justice. Nevertheless, legal rules and precedents will inform the court in
narrowing the issue and in making that hard decision, much as they do in
other areas of the law.
2.

What Elements Describe the Cause?

Section 1 of the Restatement (Third) states that "[a] person who is
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in
restitution." 33 Although the Restatement (Third) does not describe these
specifics as elements of a cause of action, section 1 does describe the
factual characteristics and legal conclusions that establish a prima facie
30. See id. § 2(3) ("There is no liability in restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily
conferred, unless the circumstances of the transaction justify the claimant's intervention in the
absence of contract."). If the claimant has neglected to discuss or has intentionally avoided a
contractual arrangement, restitution will not be available because contracting for these obligations
is preferred over restitution. See id. § 2 cmt. b. As discussed below, the existence of a valid and
enforceable contract prevents the claim that one party has been unjustly enriched by virtue of the
contract's operation. The Restatement (Third) recites the following limiting principle: "A valid
contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope, displacing to that
extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment." Id. § 2(2).
31. See id. § 10.
32. See id. § 10 cmt. a.
33. Id. § 1.
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claim for restitution. The defendant's liability thus depends on the
acquisition of a benefit at the expense of the plaintiff and, finally, on the
court's conclusion that retention of this benefit constitutes unjust
enrichment.3 4
These three elements describe the core requirements that any plaintiff
must fulfill before the remedies of restitution become available. Some
courts insist on referring to unjust enrichment as a mere theory justifying
restitution, but calling the concept a theory obscures its practical
importance. Proving the civil liability that authorizes a court to award
restitution requires more than a moral or theoretical decision about whether
some person deserves a particular enrichment. One proceeds as with any
other legal conflict to determine unjust enrichment by considering facts and
narrowing issues in light of rules and precedents. Unjust enrichment thereby
stands not for an abstract theory but for a conclusion of liability reached
after the application of legal rules.
In applying the first two elements of the unjust enrichment cause of
action, one investigates the relationship of the parties, and this effort may
well end the claim. The plaintiff has standing to sue only to recover that
benefit to which he has an arguable right. The plaintiff must have lost
something, and therefore no disinterested person can challenge the
enrichment of another. Furthermore, the defendant must have obtained a
benefit at the expense of the plaintiff in a manner that was not foreordained
by contract. As noted throughout this Article, a valid and enforceable
contract bars a suit for unjust enrichment.
Consider the following example as Hypothetical 2. Assume two
parties, one being the active operator and the other an investor, jointly
participate in the purchase of an oil and gas lease in accordance with a
34. The Colorado Supreme Court in its decision in Lewis v. Lewis explained its unjust
enrichment claim in the following manner: "We have previously determined that a party claiming
unjust enrichment must prove that (1) the defendant received a benefit (2) at the plaintiffs
expense (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit
without commensurate compensation." Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008) (en
banc). If one worries that this is a vague and open-ended claim, compare it with the universally
accepted claim for negligence. Courts describe a negligence claim as one requiring a showing that
(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) thereby
proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. See MICHOL O'CONNOR, O'Connor's Texas Causes of
Action 657 (2012).
The Restatement (Third) voices some hesitation about the use of checklists to determine
35.
liability for restitution. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 1 cmt. d (2011). The danger, however, arises from the inclusion of particularized factors such as
one requiring the defendant to have "appreciated" the benefit received. See id. The elements listed
by the Colorado Supreme Court in Lewis serve the important function of alerting litigants and
lower courts to that which must be pleaded and proved. Furthermore, these elements are free of
unnecessary and mischievous limiting factors and closely track what the Restatement (Third)
posits as the fundamental principles of liability.
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contractual agreement. Assume the active operator acquires a second oil
and gas lease without including the investor. If their agreement says
nothing about other ventures, the first purchase does not prove that the
active party owes the investing party a portion of the profits obtained from
another lease. Although the investor may feel betrayed by not being
included on the second lease, that party has no arguable right under these
facts to the benefit being sought. Even if the active party acquires a
benefit from the second lease, that benefit was not obtained at the expense
of the investing party. In this fashion, the first two elements, though
seemingly factual, can answer the question posed by the third element to
prove no unjust enrichment occurred.
3.

Should the Cause ofAction Be Independent?

The independence of the cause of action for unjust enrichment
becomes especially important when the defendant has obtained a benefit
because of the plaintiff s mistake. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff
may have no tort or contract claim. For example, suppose your client
attempted an online transfer of $200,000 to her local bank account but
misstated her account number. Consider these facts as Hypothetical 3. This
transmission error caused the deposit of her money in the account of an
unrelated party, who then moved the money into certificates of deposit,
thereby placing the money beyond the immediate power of the bank.
Removing money from one's own bank account does not appear to be a
wrongful act or in violation of any agreement an account holder generally
has with his bank. This recipient did, however, obtain a benefit at the
expense of your client, and no legal justification exists that is sufficient to
allow retention of that benefit. 3 9
Even if one argued that in Hypothetical 3 a tort claim did support your
client's suit for her $200,000, the remedy in tort would typically consist of a
36. These facts are taken from Rankin v. Naftalis. See Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940,
942-43 (Tex. 1977).
37. See id. at 946. The second lease was outside the operating agreement and therefore
outside any fiduciary relationship. Id.
38. See, e.g., Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank in Abilene, 628 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. 1982)
("Generally, a party who pays funds under a mistake of fact may recover restitution of those funds
if the party to whom payment was made has not materially changed his position in reliance
thereon. The purpose of such restitution is to prevent unconscionable loss to the party paying out
the funds and unjust enrichment to the party receiving the payment." (citations omitted)).
39. See Castano v. Wells Fargo Bank, 82 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no
pet.). The facts of Hypothetical 3 come from the Castano case. Id. at 41. In Castano, the plaintiff
sued the bank, which then impleaded the recipient of the funds. Id. at 42. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust, which forced the recipient to return the
certificates of deposit to the plaintiff. Id. at 43.
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monetary judgment for the principal plus interest. In contrast, the unjust
enrichment cause of action supports restitution or return of the benefit
acquired by the defendant. In this case, the plaintiff would seek a
constructive trust, which amounts to an injunction ordering the defendant to
return the certificates of deposit that he unjustly holds. Which claim and
remedy favors the plaintiff: the CDs handed over under threat of contempt
or a money judgment against someone who might during the enforcement
process spend your client's money on a vacation tour of Europe?
Another valuable aspect of restitution has to do with what is called the
right to force disgorgement of profits. Assume, as Hypothetical 4, a
geologist employee of an oil company uses confidential company
information to aid his collaborators in buying oil and gas leases. These illgotten gains, the leases, now have a value approaching one million dollars,
but the geological data that was purloined had a relatively negligible value.
A tort claim for this theft would seem limited to the value of the data
converted at the time of conversion, but restitution from a conscious
wrongdoer who converts a plaintiff s property includes disgorgement of any
profits made through the use of the purloined property.40 In this fashion,
restitution can offer a recovery far greater than the plaintiff s loss.
Unjust enrichment does not provide an independent claim when a valid
and enforceable contract covers the subject matter of the dispute. This
limitation applies because the law of contract assumes that one party may
often benefit at the other party's expense, and contract law would be
undermined if the losing party could ignore a binding agreement in order to
seek the other party's gains. However, contractual claims do not always
succeed, and some contracts may be susceptible to rescission because of
mutual mistake or fraud. Where appropriate, therefore, a plaintiff should
consider an unjust enrichment claim as an alternative in case the contract
proves unenforceable.
The existence of a generally applicable cause of action for unjust
enrichment would avoid the need for special unjust enrichment claims, such
as quantum meruit or money had and received. As recognized in Texas, the
elements of the special unjust enrichment claim for money had and received
differ little from the three elements of an unjust enrichment claim except
that such a claim does not support the equitable remedies of restitution.
Furthermore, the use of the arcane common-count terminology adds another

40. See, e.g., Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1952) ("When property
has thus been wrongfully acquired, equity converts the holder into a trustee, and compels him to
account for all gains from such conduct."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST

ENRICHMENT § 3 (2011) ("A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong.").
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layer of mystery to this sort of litigation, as do the Latinate title and ancient
origins of the claim of quantum meruit.
4.

Policy Reasons Supporting the GeneralClaim

One can easily conjure reasons for having a clearly established legal
remedy to prevent unjust enrichment. 4 1 First, it prevents unjustified
deprivations of money, property, or other benefits. Second, this cause of
action supplements existing rights by providing a remedy where neither tort
nor contract would. Finally, at a high level of generality, liability for unjust
enrichment depends on a simple premise of fairness that applies additional
protection for one's property. To some, applying that premise in law
appears dangerous because of its generality, but that generality provides
flexibility and, in practice, is constrained by limiting rules and defenses.
B.

Restitution

The law of restitution encompasses both a cause of action and a set of
remedies. However, the definition of the term fits more comfortably as a
reference to a distinct set of court-made remedies. These remedies prevent
unjust enrichment, value profits acquired through use of wrongfully taken
funds, and secure either property or a lien on property. The following is a
list of the means that may be used to achieve restitution:
* Monetary award;
* Equitable accounting;
* Constructive trust-traced property;
* Equitable lien-traced property;
* Equitable subrogation-traced to lien removal;
* Reformation of documents; and
* Rescission of contracts.
The basic monetary award for restitution returns to the plaintiff the
amount of the defendant's gain in a judgment. To calculate this basic award,
one determines the value of the defendant's unjust enrichment at the
plaintiffs expense.4 2 In many instances, the defendant's enrichment will
equal the plaintiffs loss. However, a conscious wrongdoer who has
enhanced the value of the property taken at the plaintiffs expense or
41.
See James Steven Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the
Law ofRestitution and Unjust Enrichment, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 55, 57 (2007) ("The central

substantive notion is that one must not (unjustifiably) harm another. The correlative remedial
principle might be expressed as 'a party who unjustifiably harms another owes a duty to pay a sum
of money that will compensate the other for the harm.'").
42.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49(1)
(2011).
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profited from its use must disgorge those profits to the plaintiff.43 As noted
in the discussion of Hypothetical 4, this disgorgement of profits occurs
because the law seeks to prevent a wrongdoer from benefitting, even
marginally, from his wrong.4 Even so, disgorgement does not place the
wrongdoer in a worse position than had he not wrongfully taken the
plaintiff s property and, for that reason, should not be considered a punitive
damages award subject to the Texas statutory procedures and limitations. 45
If a plaintiff can trace the benefit taken to identifiable property held by
the defendant, a court can impress a constructive trust on that property. The
court thus declares plaintiff's superior title to that property and orders the
transfer of title by the defendant to the plaintiff.46 Again, the plaintiff can
recover any increase in the property's value when the defendant wrongfully
acted to acquire that property. For example, as Hypothetical 5, assume the
defendant had embezzled $100,000 from the plaintiff and can be shown to
have invested that money to create an Apple stock account. If the value of
the stock has doubled by the time of suit, the plaintiff will ask the court to
award a constructive trust on the entire account, now worth $200,000. If the
plaintiff s money was instead used to purchase only 60% of the Apple stock
in the account, the court can create an equitable lien in favor of the plaintiff
on 60% of the account or $120,000.4 Both the constructive trust and the
equitable lien give the plaintiff priority over the defendant's other
creditors.48
Professor Dobbs presents the case of a defendant who embezzles
$100,000 and uses this money to pay off the bank note on his home and
thereby gains release of the bank's lien.49 Unlike a claim for either a
constructive trust or an equitable lien, the plaintiffs money was not
exchanged for title to property now held by the defendant. Instead, the
money removed a debt on defendant's property. In this hypothetical,
however, the court can apply equitable subrogation both to award the
plaintiff a judgment for the $100,000 and to secure the debt with a lien on

43.
See id. § 49(4).
44. See id. §§ 3, 51(4).
45.
Disgorgement of profits causes the defendant no net loss and therefore does not amount
to an award of punitive damages. See id. § 51 cmt. k. In InternationalBankers Life Insurance Co.
v. Holloway, the Texas Supreme Court held that forcing disgorgement of profits through equity
did not limit the plaintiff from also seeking punitive damages. 368 S.W.2d 567, 584 (Tex. 1963).
46.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. b
(2011).
47.
See id. §56.
48. But see id. § 61 (stating that a plaintiffs right to traceable profits at the expense of an
insolvent defendant is subordinated to the claims of innocent dependents and creditors).
49. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 4.3(4), at 604-06.
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the defendant's home.50 By imposing the lien, the court awards the plaintiff
the bank's rights as they existed before it released its lien.
The Texas Supreme Court has also recognized the equitable nature of
the remedy of rescission.51 Rescission allows a court to set aside a contract
because of mutual mistake or wrongdoing, and restitution comes into play
because it would be unjust to allow one party to retain any benefit gained
before rescission.52 In addition to rescission, a court can reform a document
that was mistakenly drafted. For example, the Texas Supreme Court
ordered rescission of a deed that erroneously conveyed only one property
even though the grantors intended to convey two properties to the purchaser
at foreclosure. The Court refused to allow the parties to use a correction
deed for these purposes, but held that rescission and reformation were
appropriate to avoid the unjust enrichment of the debtor.54 Reformation
allows the contract to stand, but corrects any mistake. In an earlier case, the
Supreme Court reformed a document that erroneously stated that a debtor
had fully paid the note held by his bank. 5 If enforced, such mistakes can
unjustifiably enrich a party to the agreement or a third party, and
reformation operates to prevent that unjust enrichment.
IV. LOWER TEXAS COURTS: No INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION
Most of the Texas courts of appeals and federal courts that have
considered the question under Texas law have rejected the existence of an
independent cause of action for unjust enrichment. It is difficult to
understand what independence means in this context. Some courts refer to
unjust enrichment as merely a theory of recovery rather than as the basis for
recovery or as a description of the result when restitution is denied. Others
suggest that the field consists solely of special claims, such as the moneyhad-and-received and quantum meruit causes of action.
Black's Law Dictionary indicates that independent can mean either
that something is "[n]ot associated with another (often larger) entity" or that
it is "[n]ot dependent or contingent on something else."56 When lower
Texas courts deny that unjust enrichment is an independent cause of action,
they may therefore mean that unjust enrichment must be viewed in light of
its association with contract law. However, unjust enrichment claims have
50.

51.
52.
53.
2009).

See id. at 606.

See Smith v. Nat'1 Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. 1979).
See id.; 1 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 4.3(6), at 614-15.
See Myrad Props., Inc. v. LaSalle Bank Nat'1 Ass'n, 300 S.W.3d 746, 752-53 (Tex.

54.

See id. at 750-51, 753.

55.
56.

See First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 183 S.W. 874, 876-77 (Tex. 1916).
Black's Law Dictionary 774 (7th ed. 1999).
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only a historical and fictional association with contract claims; the two do
not share common elements beyond that history. The denial of
independence might mean that unjust enrichment claims or the remedies of
restitution depend on the proof of either a claim in tort or contract. This
argument means that the unjust enrichment cause of action merely adds an
element or theory to tort or contract claims as needed to trigger restitution.
None of these explanations can be supported by the decisions of the Texas
Supreme Court.
A.

Unjust Enrichment as a Theory ofRecovery

In 2002, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals decided the case of
Mowbray v. Avery57 and included in its opinion an often-cited discussion of
unjust enrichment. The Corpus Christi court considered whether it was
controlled by language from Texas Supreme Court decisions suggesting
that unjust enrichment was a cause of action but decided that it was not.
Instead, the Corpus Christi court emphasized that the Texas Supreme Court
had referred to unjust enrichment as a remedy as well as a basis for
liability. 6 0 Because of these different uses, the court of appeals refused to
accept "these statements as recognition of unjust enrichment as an
independent cause of action, but [saw them] simply as a reiteration of the
well[-]established principle that a suit for restitution may be raised against a
party based on the theory of unjust enrichment." 6 The Corpus Christi court
thus concluded that "unjust enrichment [was] not a distinct independent
,,62
cause of action," and characterized it instead as "a theory of recovery.
The court of appeals failed to explain how one would plead and prove
such a "suit for restitution" or why any theory that allowed recovery was
not a cause of action. In this regard, one federal court has noted, "Texas
courts may waffle about whether unjust enrichment is a theory of recovery
or an independent cause of action, but either way, they have provided the
plaintiff with relief when the defendant has been unjustly enriched." 6 3 The
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals' ruling seems to support this observation
57.
Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
58.
Recent decisions by Texas courts of appeals have repeated the statement that unjust
enrichment is not an independent cause of action and have used Mowbray as authority. See, e.g.,
Casstevens v. Smith, 269 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied); R.M.
Dudley Constr. Co. v. Dawson, 258 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, pet. denied);
Argyle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Wolf, 234 S.W.3d 229, 246 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
59. See Mowbray, 76 S.W.3d at 680.
60. Id. at 680 n.25.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 679.
63. Newington Ltd. v. Forrester, No. 3:08-CV-0864-G ECF, 2008 WL 4908200 at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 13, 2008).
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by concluding that recovery can be supported under an unjust enrichment
theory when the defendant "has obtained a benefit from another due to
fraud, duress or taking of undue advantage."6 4
This language appears to accept restitution for reasons that do not
differ significantly from unjust enrichment. The court of appeals approved
restitution of a benefit that "would be unconscionable for the receiving
party to retain" 65 when circumstances created an "implied or quasicontractual obligation to repay." 66 Without demanding proof of tortious acts
by the defendant, the court of appeals also recognized that "[t]he unjust
enrichment doctrine applies the principles of restitution to disputes where
there is no actual contract."6 In this manner, the court of appeals seemed to
recognize that a legal basis for restitution exists outside tort or contractthat is, "independent" of those two bodies of law.
1.

Not a Contract or a Tort

In following Mowbray, other Texas courts have accepted its language
and have seemingly accepted restitution as a remedy for a quasi-contract
cause of action that is neither tort nor contract. In Walker v. Cotter
Properties, Inc.,68 the Dallas Court of Appeals made the following
statement: "Unjust enrichment is not an independent cause of action but
rather characterizes the result of a failure to make restitution of benefits
either wrongfully or passively received under circumstances which give rise
to an implied or quasi-contractual obligation to repay."69 The court thereby
characterized restitution as a remedy to prevent unjust enrichment and
stated that the remedy applies whether the defendant acted wrongfully or
not. Because one who passively receives a benefit ordinarily does not
thereby commit a tort, the Dallas Court of Appeals necessarily recognized
that the liability it was discussing may not rest in the law of tort. The
reference to an "implied or quasi-contractual obligation to pay" effectively
separates the obligation from one based on an agreement of the parties.
Instead, such an obligation to pay arises as a matter of law to avoid what
would otherwise be an unjust enrichment.70

64. Mowbray, 76 S.W.3d at 679 (citing Heldenfels Bros. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832
S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992)).
65. Id. at 679.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Walker v. Cotter Props., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
69. Id. at 900.
70. See id.
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Numerous Texas courts have quoted this language from Walker in
rejecting an independent claim for unjust enrichment. 7' As suggested above,
one argument for this conclusion would be that unjust enrichment claims
are always dependent on other causes of action. This explanation fails for at
least three reasons. First, since a valid contract preempts such claims, unjust
enrichment could only be dependent on tort claims.7 2 If the contract is
faulty, an unjust enrichment claim can apply, but its basis would be unjust
enrichment and not contract law. Second, contending that unjust enrichment
depends on the existence of a valid tort claim fails to account for the
plaintiff's historical right to "waive the tort" and assert unjust enrichment
instead. Third, the view that restitution is merely an alternative remedy in
tort or contract has been directly contradicted by Texas Supreme Court
rulings justifying restitution when unjust enrichment was the result of the
claimant's mistake.74
Restitution allows a claimant to recover because of her own mistake.
Tort claims, on the other hand, allow recovery when the defendant's
mistake causes the plaintiff harm and amounts to negligence, defective
design, or failure to warn. Restitution restores a benefit to a plaintiff even
though an innocent defendant passively received that benefit as a result of
the plaintiffs own mistake. This distinction was noted in the discussion of
Hypothetical 3, where the plaintiff through a wire transfer erroneously
directed her money into the defendant's bank account.75
2.

Quasi-Contract

Even the Dallas Court of Appeals in Walker recognized a general
cause of action, but labeled it as one arising from "an implied or quasi71.
See Casstevens v. Smith, 269 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet.
denied); R.M. Dudley Constr. Co. v. Dawson, 258 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, pet.
denied); Argyle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Wolf, 234 S.W.3d 229, 246 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no
pet.); Friberg-Cooper Water Supply Corp. v. Elledge, 197 S.W.3d 826, 832 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2006), rev'd on other grounds, 240 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. 2007). The federal courts in the Fifth
Circuit, when applying Texas law, have concluded that unjust enrichment is not an independent
cause of action but is instead the theory supporting special unjust enrichment claims. See Hancock
v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 539, 560 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. 2005).
72.
See Ferrous Prods. Co. v. Gulf States Trading Co., 323 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. Civ.
73.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1959), aff'd, 332 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1960); see also William A. Keener,
Waiver of Tort, 6 HARV. L. REv. 223, 232 (1893).
See Myrad Props., Inc. v. LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 300 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Tex. 2009);
74.
Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1974). If the remedies of restitution

depended on the commission of a tort, the impressing of a constructive trust in Castano v. Wells
Fargo Bank would also have to be deemed erroneous. 82 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, no pet.)
75.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-39; see also Castano, 82 S.W.3d at 41.
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contractual obligation to repay." 7 6 As explained above, these quasi-contract
and implied (in law) rights do not arise from contracts intentionally entered
into by willing parties or because of the tortious acts of the defendant.
Neither contract nor tort law authorizes such an "obligation to repay." Quite
simply put, courts impose the obligation in order to serve the policies that
demand restitution from those who have been unjustly enriched.
The Dallas Court of Appeals, when it decided Walker, disclosed
through its reasoning those factors it deemed relevant to recovery on quasicontract.77 The case arose because third parties made fraudulent
inducements to these litigants, thereby causing them to engage in worthless
investments. 78 The plaintiff, Jerry Walker, settled his claims against the
third parties and as part of his compensation was assigned their claim
against the Cotters. 79 As an assignee, Walker sued the Cotters based on
"theories of quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion."80 He based
his argument on the assertion that the Cotters profited from what was little
more than a Ponzi scheme. After a bench trial, the trial court granted a
directed verdict in favor of the Cotters and held that they were not unjustly
enriched by funds paid them by the third party.81
In upholding the take-nothing judgment entered against the plaintiff,
the Dallas Court of Appeals noted that his cause of action was one based on
quasi-contract "to prevent a party from obtaining a benefit from another by
fraud, duress, unjust enrichment, or because of an undue advantage." 82 In
this respect at least, the Dallas court's reasoning in Walker tracks that of the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Mowbray. Both conclude that a cause of
action exists to prevent unjust enrichment, but both label it quasi-contract.
As a consequence, these two courts, and the courts that follow Walker or
Mowbray, have accepted an independent cause of action that supports
restitution to remedy unjust enrichment even though they seem unwilling to
label it as such.
Labeling the cause as one in quasi-contract adds confusion to, or at
least sheds no light on, the subject. That label informs one about what the
cause is not (not a contract) rather than what it is. As noted above, the
quasi-contract label's original function was to act as a linguistic cloak for
76.
pet.).

See Walker v. Cotter Prop. Inc., 181 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no

77.

Id

78.

Id. at 898.

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 898-99.
See id. at 900.

83. See id.; Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663, 679 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet.
denied).
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the expansion of the common law courts' jurisdiction over unjust
enrichment. The common law courts thought, perhaps, that unjust
enrichment involved a wrong that sufficiently resembled a breach of
contract. Quasi means that one thing resembles, but is not actually the same
as, something else.84 Using such terminology might have been necessary to
shield the courts from criticism or from a hostile reaction by the kings or
queens of England, but these fictions have long ago outlived their
usefulness.
The Mowbray and Walker decisions characterize unjust enrichment as
either the theory behind, or an element of, a general claim labeled quasicontract. Even if this were merely a contest about the proper name for a
claim to prevent unjust enrichment, the quasi-contract terminology would
be the wrong choice. The historical authority these courts draw upon for a
claim in quasi-contract firmly limits that right of action to the common law.
That historical source therefore prevents a quasi-contract claim from
supporting an equitable remedy. As a consequence, using the quasi-contract
label appears to leave the equitable remedies of restitution unsupported. The
Texas Supreme Court has clearly recognized those equitable remedies and
has used them to prevent unjust enrichment. On the other hand, labeling the
independent claim more in accordance with its function-as one for the
prevention of unjust enrichment-would more clearly identify a claim that
could also support both the common law and the equitable remedies of
restitution.
Special Unjust Enrichment Claims

B.

Another reason for denying independence to an unjust enrichment
cause of action comes from the conclusion that the field really has been
occupied by special unjust enrichment claims. However, that argument
falters once one recognizes, as above, the historical background that
provides the basis for these claims in the first place. The money-had-andreceived and quantum meruit claims recognized in Texas arose originally as
common counts in the common law's special assumpsit form of action.
That historical background appears to restrict these claims so that, as with a
quasi-contract claim, they would not support the numerous equitable
restitution remedies that have been recognized and applied by the Texas
Supreme Court.

84.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (7th ed. 1999).
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Money Had and Received

Over fifty years ago, the Texas Supreme Court described the cause of
action for money had and received as one that depends on findings that (1)
money held by the defendant (2) belongs to the plaintiff (3) as a matter of
"equity, justice, and law."85 In that case, Staats v. Miller, the supreme court
noted that the money-had-and-received cause was substantially free of
restrictive rules and formalities because it depends on the "abstract justice
of the case." 86 Proof of the defendant's wrongdoing in acquiring the
plaintiff s money or benefit may add equitable weight to the plaintiff s case,
but wrongdoing is not a requirement for the remedy. This cause of action
therefore allows restitution so the plaintiff can recover the money unjustly
held by the defendant.8 8
The money-had-and-received cause is specialized in the limited sense
that its language refers to money rather than to real or personal property, but
Texas courts have accepted its application in cases in which tangible
property has been taken and converted into money by the defendant.8 9 In
Tri-State Chemicals, Inc. v. Western Organics, Inc., the Amarillo Court of

Appeals overturned a summary judgment for the defendant based on the
trial court's finding 90 that the plaintiffs money-had-and-received claim
failed because it sought recovery of property rather than money. The
Amarillo Court of Appeals noted that the plaintiff had asserted two causes
of action, one in assumpsit and a second for money had and received, and
concluded that Texas courts looked past "names and procedural
technicalities." 9' It held that "irrespective of the name appended to the

85. Staats v. Miller, 243 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 1951). The three elements announced by
the Texas Supreme Court closely track the three elements of the modern cause of action for unjust
enrichment. In fact, the Texas money-had-and-received cause of action, if expanded to include
other property could function as an independent cause of action if it also supported equitable
remedies.
86. Id. The justice of the case may not be so abstract as the supreme court implies. See also
H.E. Austin v. Duval, 735 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied) (plaintiffs
must show that the money belonged to them when it was obtained by the defendant).
87. See Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. v. Pitts, 236 S.W.3d 201, 207 (Tex. 2007); Edwards v.
Mid-Continent Office Distribs., L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
88. See Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 966 S.W.2d 467, 469-70 (Tex. 1998);
see also Stonebridge, 236 S.W.3d at 207 (overruling the class certification of a money-had-andreceived class); Best Buy Co. v. Barrera, 248 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. 2007) (same).
89. See Tri-State Chems., Inc. v. W. Organics, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 189, 194-95 (Tex. App.Amarillo 2002, pet. denied).
90. The trial judge sent the parties a letter stating that the plaintiffs reliance on a moneyhad-and-received claim was "misplaced" because the defendant held no money or its equivalent.
See id. at 193.

91.

Id. at 194.
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second claim, [the plaintiff] effectively seeks the recovery of its property
92
wrongfully taken" and that Texas law allowed such a recovery.
In Edwards v. Mid-Continent Office Distributors, L.P., the Dallas
Court of Appeals noted that many Texas courts use the money-had-andreceived label interchangeably with a right to restitution, claim in
assumpsit, or one for unjust enrichment.93 In the case, the plaintiff alleged
that a third party had deceived him into paying debts the third party owed
the two defendants. 9 4 The plaintiff sued the recipients of his money, rather
than the third party, presumably because they were in possession of his
money and could pay a judgment.9 5 The Dallas Court of Appeals in
Edwards concluded that the trial court had not unreasonably balanced the
equities in the case to find against the plaintiff.9 6 As the court in Edwards
noted, calling the claim one for money had and received, restitution, quasicontract, or unjust enrichment should have little effect on the analysis. 97
Nevertheless, in Hancock v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.,98 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas stated that the Texas
Supreme Court has never "recognized a claim for unjust enrichment as
independent from an action for money had and received." 99 This ruling
would, if adopted, reduce unjust enrichment to either an alternative label or
a theoretical justification for the money-had-and-received cause of action
under Texas law. That ruling might also logically support the conclusion
that these special causes of action occupy the field in preventing unjust
enrichment.100 Assumpsit's common counts of money had and received and
quantum meruit, as noted, originated in the common law courts and
historically provide no support for equitable restitution.
2.

Quantum Meruit

Under Texas law, when the claim is not based on a breach of contract,
one pleads a cause of action in quantum meruit to recover compensation for
goods or services provided to the defendant. That means this cause of action
fits within the historical category of a quasi-contract. Instead of a contract,

92.

Id. at 195.

93.
Edwards v. Mid-Continent Office Distribs., L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 837 n.7 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
94.
See id. at 835.
95.
Id. at 834-35.
96.
Id. at 841.

97.

See id.

98.

Hancock v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 539 (N.D. Tex. 2009).

99.

Id. at 561.

100.

See id. at 560-61; see also Verizon Emp. Benefits Comm. v. Frawley, 655 F. Supp. 2d

644, 648 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
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the right to recover depends on an unjust enrichment theory.10 A valid
contract-one supporting a breach of contract action-can be created by
express terms or can be inferred from the words and actions of the parties.
The latter is referred to as an "implied-in-fact contract." The implied-in-fact
contract depends on the apparent intention of the parties "manifested in
language or by implication from other circumstances." 10 2 In contrast, the
quantum meruit cause of action allows recovery only when no valid,
express or implied-in-fact agreement exists between the parties; it is what
has been called an "implied-in-law contract" or, as it is termed more
generally, a quasi-contract.10 3
Proof of a valid contract prevents recovery under a quantum meruit
claim. 10 4 A contract represents the agreed-upon rights and obligations of the
parties, and the policies of unjust enrichment do not operate to allow one
party to avoid contractual obligations. 0 5 Nevertheless, plaintiffs often assert
a quantum meruit claim as an alternative to a breach of contract claim in
order to protect against the possibility that the latter claim might fail.
The elements of a quantum meruit cause of action are:
1. valuable services were rendered or materials furnished [by the
plaintiff];
2. for the person sought to be charged;
3. which services and materials were accepted by the person sought to
be charged, used and enjoyed by him;
4. under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought
to be charged that the plaintiff in performing such services was
expecting to be paid by the person sought to be charged. 10 6
The first two of these elements closely track the first two elements of a
general unjust enrichment cause of action. The defendant must have
obtained a particular kind of benefit (services or goods) at the expense of
the plaintiff. However, in lieu of the more general showing that retention of
the benefit without compensation would be unjust, the quantum meruit

See Excess Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc., 246
101.
S.W.3d 42, 49-50 (Tex. 2008).
102. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4 cmt. a (1981).
103. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. 2005).
104. See Frank's Casing,246 S.W.3d at 50; see also Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 936
(Tex. 1988).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. c
105.
(2011) (restitution must be subordinated to contract law when parties have defined their own
obligations by agreement).
106. Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990). The
Texas Supreme Court's statement of the first element merges the general assumpsit counts of
quantum meruit (claim for services) and quantum valebat (claims for goods).
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claim requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant knew before receiving the
benefit that the plaintiff expected compensation.
One might reasonably expect that a defendant who knowingly
accepted services with knowledge of the plaintiffs expectation of
compensation would be bound by an implied-in-fact contract. Failure to pay
under these circumstances would leave the plaintiff with a breach of
contract cause of action. For instance, a person who makes an offer to a
farmer to clear a ten-acre tract of the farmer's land may fail to agree with
the farmer on a price. However, when the farmer agrees to this service, he
does so with knowledge that the offeror expected compensation. Such
knowledge would seem invariably to transform a quantum meruit claim into
an implied-in-fact contract requiring the farmer to pay a reasonable fee. 107
However, the agreement might fail because of indefiniteness or for
some other reason. Under those circumstances, a quantum meruit claim
based on unjust enrichment rather than on contract would be appropriate.
The amount of recovery would be similar to a suit for an implied-in-fact
contract-that is, a reasonable price.10 8 Assume instead, as Hypothetical 6,
the land-clearing offer was made to farmer A, who agreed to have the land
cleared, but the land-clearing company mistakenly cleared a ten-acre tract
owned by farmer B, thinking it was the land of farmer A. If we assume no
other facts, the land-clearing company cannot recover from farmer A or
farmer B based on contract, and could only seek recovery through quantum
meruit against farmer B, the party who received the benefit of its services.
Under those circumstances, farmer B would contend that the landclearing company could not recover in quantum meruit because farmer B
failed to accept the services and, at the time they were provided, was not
reasonably notified that the plaintiff expected compensation. Because the
benefit was nonreturnable, farmer B has no choice but to enjoy these
benefits. In short, the Texas requirements for quantum meruit make sense
only when limited to the failed contract case.
If, on the other hand, this claim were described as a general unjust
enrichment claim, farmer B would assert the "volunteer's defense" that
denies recovery to those who, without request, voluntarily provide services.
That defense would not block the company's claim if it could prove that
farmer B knew of the work as it was going on and knew of the company's
mistake. 109 The company could also counter that defense by seeking

107.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. e
(2011).
108. See id. § 31 cmt. e, illus. 7.
109. Professor Kovacic-Fleischer argues that the key difference between a finding of
contract or reliance solely on quantum meruit lies in the existence of a request by the defendant
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restitution as a mistaken improver,"o but courts find it difficult to order
compensation from a defendant who did nothing to encourage work that it
would not have chosen to buy."' In other words, a general unjust
enrichment claim would allow, or encounter defenses that prevented,
restitution in most of the same cases. The resolution would, however, be
reached through a more direct discussion of the essential questions rather
than through artificially imposed nomenclature.
Quantum meruit claims have also been applied in cases in which the
plaintiff was a subcontractor, having a contract only with a now-insolvent
general contractor. Difficult questions arise when the unpaid subcontractor
sues the property owner and its quantum meruit claim depends on the
existence of facts tending to satisfy the fourth requirement. The owner who
has paid the prime contractor and is now sued in quantum meruit by the
subcontractor can argue that it is not enriched, much less unjustly so, by
receipt of the services provided by the subcontractor." 2
The last two quantum meruit elements will thus be affected by the
same factors that would be considered as limitations on or defenses to a
general unjust enrichment claim. In both instances, the court will determine
whether retention of a benefit by the defendant was unjustified. If the owner
had not paid the general contractor and possesses the benefit added by those
services that it requested (though from the general contractor), retention of
that benefit seems unjustified. The owner, who expected to pay a certain
amount for the services provided, is not unjustly treated by having to
transfer that sum to the subcontractor." 3 The last two elements of quantum
meruit add little to the proper resolution of this conflict, and analysis would
be much improved by adopting a general unjust enrichment claim that is
cabined by very similar defenses."14
In the Texas Supreme Court decision Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., Vortt provided seismic services and information in order to
for the services. Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Quantum Meruit and the Restatement (Third)
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 27 Rev. Litig. 127, 132 (2007).
"A person who improves the real or personal property of another, acting by mistake,
110.
has a claim in restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 (2011). In Texas, the property code provides a
statutory remedy for one who, in good faith, possessed the property and made improvements. See
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 22.021 (2000).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 cmt. a
111.
(2011).
See Doug Rendleman, Quantum Meruitfor the Subcontractor:Has Restitution Jumped
112.
offDawson's Dock?, 79 TEX. L. REv. 2055, 2073 (2001).
See id. at 2074.
113.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(3) (2011)
114.
("There is no liability in restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily conferred, unless the
circumstances of the transaction justify the claimant's intervention in the absence of contract.").
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encourage Chevron to enter a joint operating agreement with Vortt."
Without entering the agreement, but with knowledge of Vortt's motive,
Chevron drilled a producing well at the location indicated by Vortt's
information.' 16 In the subsequent litigation, a trial court entered judgment
on Vortt's quantum meruit claim, awarding it $178,750 for information that
cost it roughly $18,000.117 In other words, the majority upheld a trial court
award that was approximately ten times the cost of the data, effectively
forcing Chevron to disgorge some of the profits earned from the data. Vortt
thus gained a much greater award than it was likely to obtain in a
contractual arrangement. Had the supreme court used a general unjust
enrichment cause of action, it would have been more difficult to order
disgorgement except upon proof that Chevron's actions made it a conscious
wrongdoer." 8
This discussion began with a consideration of the factors that
distinguish a claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract (one inferred
from the circumstances) from a claim for unjust enrichment (in the absence
of a contract). Quantum meruit's third element-proving the defendant
"accepted" the services and "used and enjoyed" them-imposes artificial
requirements to the extent that they divert attention from the inquiry about
whether the defendant was unjustly enriched by not having to pay for the
services received. The fourth element explains little to aid in distinguishing
a true contract claim and a quantum meruit claim. In most instances, a
defendant who has timely notice that the plaintiff is performing services
with the expectation of payment will either have requested services or be
estopped from denying a contract. The elements of a Texas quantum meruit
claim seem to provide recovery only when a contractual claim fails for
some reason. Application of the general unjust enrichment cause of action
would cause less confusion and allow better decisions."l 9
V. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

The modem cause of action establishing civil liability for restitution
rests on the fulfillment of three requirements: (1) The defendant must have
Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990).
115.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 946 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
118. Even if Chevron had requested the services and goods provided by Vortt, recovery
should have been limited to the lesser of a market price or that price the defendant expressed a
willingness to pay. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 31

cmt. e (2011).
See Heldenfels Bros. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Tex. 1992) (Texas
119.
Supreme Court decided against subcontractor's noncontractual claim for payment against the city
on the basis of unjust enrichment even though a quantum meruit claim was also made).
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gained a benefit (2) at the expense of the plaintiff, (3) and retention of that
benefit must be shown to be unjust. 120 An independent unjust enrichment
claim of this sort would replace the artificial limitations of special unjust
enrichment claims and exist as a freestanding cause of action independent
of tort or contract law. Although the evidence suggests that the Texas
Supreme Court has accepted such a claim and speaks of it as an unjust
enrichment claim, that court has not done so with such clarity as to end
controversy on the issue.
The Texas Supreme Court has clearly authorized Texas courts to
adjudicate freestanding claims-ones not dependent on tort or contract and
ones based on the policy of preventing unjust enrichment.12 1 As noted
above, the supreme court has clearly recognized the special claims of
money had and received and quantum meruit-neither one of these claims
depends on proof of a right under either tort or contract.
A.

Limitationsfor Unjust Enrichment Claims

The Texas Supreme Court has expressly recognized unjust enrichment
claims by treating them separately for limitations purposes. In FribergCooper Water Supply Corp. v. Elledge, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
reversed a trial court's application of the two-year statute of limitations to
what the plaintiff labeled an unjust enrichment claim.12 2 The court of
appeals concluded that the plaintiff had actually asserted a money-had-andreceived cause of action because "[u]njust enrichment, itself, is not an
independent cause of action."l 2 3 That court also noted how money had and
received had been expanded beyond its original application to contract
cases in the famous case of Moses v. Macferlan.124 This expansion allowed
the common law courts to prevent unjust enrichment by providing
restitution in cases where contract law did not support recovery.125
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs moneyhad-and-received claim was really a claim on a debt not in writing and was
therefore subject to the four-year statute of limitations. 12 6 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed, holding that all "extra-contractual actions for
120.
(2011).

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 1 cmt.

a

121. Although a valid contract prevents use of an unjust enrichment claim, a pleader can use
such a claim as an alternative should the contract be deemed invalid.
122. Friberg-Cooper Water Supply Corp. v. Elledge, 197 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2006), rev'd, 240 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).
123. Id. at 832.
124. Id. (citing Moses v. Macferlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.)).
125.

See id.

126.

Id. at 833.
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unjust enrichment" must be brought within the two-year limitations
period. 12 7 The supreme court declared "categorically" that "[u]njust
,,128
enrichment claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations.
Although it mentioned "unjust enrichment claims" six times in its threepage per curiam opinion, the supreme court did not refer to the claim at
issue as one for money had and received. Instead, it referred to the claim as
,,1,29
one seeking restitution "under an unjust enrichment theory.
B.

Legal and EquitableRestitution

As discussed above, both the common law and equity courts of
England developed civil liability for one unjustly enriched. The different
remedies available in common law or equity to accomplish restitution
distinguished the two forms of claims. In the common law courts, the
primary remedy was a monetary award, but the courts of equity primarily
designed special forms of its injunctive remedy to prevent unjust
enrichment. The equity courts used various names, such as constructive
trusts or equitable liens, but the operative mechanism was the injunctionthe most significant remedy of equity courts.
The following decisions of the Texas Supreme Court have been chosen
because either the court's language or its ruling bears upon the question of
whether a general unjust enrichment cause of action exists in Texas law.
These decisions have been separated into the two categories: common law
or "legal" restitution (cases featuring monetary awards) and equitable
restitution (cases featuring one of the remedies developed in the courts of
equity). This division adds order to the discussion and shows how the Texas
Supreme Court has found liability for equitable restitution without regard to
the common law claims for quasi-contract, money had and received, and
quantum meruit.
C.

Legal Restitution

In Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court found
liability in a case in which the facts supported the three elements of a
general unjust enrichment cause of action.130 In Gavenda, royalty owners
sued the oil and gas lease operator for underpayment of royalties.131 The
operator had prepared division orders that, in respect to the plaintiffs,
127. Elledge v. Friberg-Cooper Water Supply Corp., 240 S.W.3d 869, 870 (Tex. 2007) (per
curiam).
128. Id. at 871.
129. Id. at 869.
130.
Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex. 1986).
131.
Id. at 691.
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erroneously reduced the percentage of their royalties. 132 Division orders
prescribe the procedure for distributing royalty proceeds and designate the
recipients and the proportion they are due from the sale of oil and gas. The
operator defended based on the Texas rule that division orders bind
underpaid royalty owners until revoked.133 Prior to that revocation, the
operator is immune to suit based on errors in the order. Both the trial court
and the court of appeals held in favor of the operator on this ground. 134
The rule protecting unrevoked division orders is typically justified by
the need to protect operators and purchasers and to enhance the stability of
the oil and gas industry.135 However, the Texas Supreme Court noted that
the rule applied when an operator overpaid some royalty owners and
underpaid others, but had itself retained none of the money it should have
paid in royalties. 136 Under these circumstances, recovery from the operator
by the underpaid royalty owners would impose double liability-the
operator would have to pay an additional amount that duplicated what it had
already paid the overpaid royalty owners.13 7 In addition, an operator who
erred in this fashion would not profit from the error and, therefore, could
not have been enriched, much less unjustly so.1 38 Furthermore, enforcing
the division order did not leave the underpaid royalty owners without a
remedy because they could sue the overpaid royalty owners. 39 The supreme
court described its reasoning by noting that "[t]he basis for recovery is
unjust enrichment; the overpaid royalty owner is not entitled to the
royalties."l 40
In the Gavenda case, the operator prepared erroneous division orders
and retained money due the underpaid royalty owners. Under these
circumstances, the Texas Supreme Court held that division orders were not
binding, and the underpaid royalty owners could recover the money
retained by the operator because to the extent it profited from its own error
"[t]here was unjust enrichment." 41 As noted, the three elements for a
general unjust enrichment cause of action consist of (1) the defendant
having obtained a benefit (2) at the expense of the plaintiff, (3) and
retention of that benefit would constitute unjust enrichment. These three
132.
133.
134.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 690.
See id. at692.
See id.

137.

Id.

135.

138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. This reasoning by the supreme court applied the three elements of a general
unjust enrichment cause of action.
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elements explain how the royalty owners (the plaintiffs) who sued the
operator (the defendant) proved that the operator retained their royalties,
thereby gaining a benefit at their expense. The operator had no justification
for retaining those benefits and was therefore unjustly enriched. When,
instead, the operator erred in paying the proper amounts to various royalty
owners but retained none of these royalties, it gained no benefit at the
expense of the underpaid royalty owners and could not have been unjustly
enriched.
In Heldenfels Brothers v. City of Corpus Christi,14 2 the Texas Supreme
Court denied the plaintiff relief under a "theory of unjust enrichment," but
cited the Pope decision for the proposition that "[a] party may recover
under the unjust enrichment theory when one person has obtained a benefit
from another by fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue advantage." 4 3
Referring to recovery based on a "theory" rather than on a cause of action 4 4
makes this quote somewhat unclear, but one does not obtain a ruling
establishing a defendant's liability without proving a cause of action. A
theory that purports to create liability must be a cause of action and not a
mere abstraction. The Texas Supreme Court thus assumed in this case,
without deciding, that an unjust enrichment cause of action exists, as did the

court of appeals.14 5
The Texas Supreme Court also used language that directly supports the
existence of a general unjust enrichment cause of action in HECI
Exploration Co. v. Neel.146 HECI was the lessee of a tract on which the
Neels held oil and gas royalties. Prior to this litigation, HECI had sued
AOP, the lessee of an adjoining tract, claiming that AOP was
overproducing their common reservoir. HECI was the sole plaintiff and
recovered a judgment against AOP, which HECI and AOP settled.147 Four
years later, the Neels sued HECI to recover that portion of HECI's
judgment that they claimed represented damages to their royalty interests.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of HECI, ruling against
all of the Neels' claims, including one for unjust enrichment.1 4 8

142. Heldenfels Bros. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1992).
143. Id. at 41 (citing Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 560, 562 (Tex. 1948)).
144. A plaintiff must plead and prove some legal basis, which we generally call a cause of
action, before a court has authority to impose a judicial remedy at the expense of the defendant.
Although the court here referred to those grounds as a theory, it was nevertheless discussing the
substantive basis for a judicial remedy. See id.
145. See City of Corpus Christi v. Heldenfels Bros., 802 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990), aff'd, 832 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1992).
146. HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998).
147. Id. at 884.
148. Id.
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The supreme court upheld summary judgment in respect to the unjust
enrichment cause based on its conclusion that HECI had no legal right to
recover from AOP for any of the interests held by the Neels.14 9 Therefore,
no part of the settlement received by HECI from AOP could represent
payment for the harm AOP's actions caused the Neels' interests. The Neels
may well have had an unjust enrichment cause of action against AOP, but
they failed to assert that claim within the limitations period.
In conclusion, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Neels could not
sue HECI for unjust enrichment because HECI could not have been
enriched at the Neels' expense in the settlement with AOP.so In this
discussion, the supreme court made the following statement: "We have
recognized that, in some circumstances, a royalty owner has a cause of
action against its lessee based on unjust enrichment, but only when the
lessee profited at the royalty owner's expense."15 On a related point, the
supreme court in HECI cited its earlier decision in Gavenda v. Strata
Energy, Inc.15 2 for the proposition that a lessee's erroneous division order
was not binding on a royalty owner when that order had caused the lessee to
retain funds due that royalty owner. 15 3 If, on the other hand, the lessee's
error merely overpays some and underpays other royalty owners, the
underpaid royalty owners possess an unjust enrichment claim against the
overpaid royalty owners but not against the lessee. 15 4 Unlike the lessee in
Gavenda, HECI had not retained or obtained any money that was legally
due the Neels, and therefore, HECI could not have been unjustly enriched at
the Neels' expense.' 55 In HECI, as noted above, the supreme court
explicitly referred to an unjust enrichment "cause of action" rather than to
an unjust enrichment theory."'
In Fortune Production Co. v. Conoco, Inc.,' 57 the Texas Supreme
Court upheld a judgment in favor of one of the plaintiffs (Cox) solely on the
basis of an unjust enrichment cause of action. 58 In distinguishing the rights
of the other plaintiffs, the supreme court stated that "[a] cause of action for
149. Id. at 891-92.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 891.
152. Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986).
153. HECI, 982 S.W.2d at 891 (citing Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d at 692-93).
154. See id.
155. Id. ("The fact that HECI may have recovered more than it was entitled is a matter about
which AOP could have complained in the suit against it, but that does not give rise to a cause of
actionfor unjust enrichment in favor of the Neels." (emphasis added)).
156. See id. ("We have recognized that, in some circumstances, a royalty owner has a cause
of action againstits lessee based on unjust enrichment, but only when the lessee profited at the
royalty owner's expense." (first emphasis added)).
157. Fortune Prod. Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2000).
158. Id. at 685.
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unjust enrichment is not available to recover payments in addition to the
contract price the parties agreed upon."159 However, the court upheld the
judgment in favor of Cox based on an unjust enrichment cause of action in
part because he was not a party to a contract during the relevant period." 0
In Fortune, four natural gas producers (Fortune, Tucker, Hankamer,
and Cox) had written agreements to sell natural gas to Conoco's
predecessor in interest, Farmland.16 ' After purchasing the interests and
receiving an assignment of these contracts, Conoco had terminated the
existing contracts and entered new ones in 1990 with three of the four
producers. Cox had refused to enter a contract, but continued selling natural
gas to Conoco. In 1992, Hankamer refused to renew its contract but
continued selling natural gas to Conoco as well.162 These four producers
sued Conoco alleging fraud in the inducement to sign the contracts in 1990,
contending Conoco misrepresented its ability to sell the gas according to a
long-term contract, and claiming unjust enrichment because Conoco had
been selling the field liquids (condensate) it collected by compressing the
natural gas flow without sufficient payment to the producers. 63
To the extent the plaintiffs had valid contracts that dealt with the
subject matter of this unjust enrichment claim, the contracts precluded their
right to recover based on unjust enrichment.'6 However, Cox had refused
to enter a contract with Conoco during the period in question, and the Texas
Supreme Court expressly upheld Cox's unjust enrichment judgment.165 The
unjust enrichment judgment awarded to Hankamer, who had stopped
entering into contracts after Cox, was remanded because the jury had not
distinguished between the time Hankamer was operating under an express
contract and the period during which Hankamer was not.16 6
The Texas Supreme Court in Fortune never described Cox's claim as
one in quantum meruit (the arguably applicable special unjust enrichment
claim). Instead, it sustained a judgment based on unjust enrichment that did
not depend on Conoco's tortious conduct. The supreme court also stated
that the plaintiffs "elected to pursue a claim for unjust enrichment rather
than breach of contract." 6 7 This statement supports the conclusion that the

159. Id. As noted above, unjust enrichment cannot stand as a cause of action to alter valid
and enforceable provisions of a contract.
160. See id.
Id. at 673-74.
161.
162. Id. at 674-75.
163. Id. at 675.
164. Id. at 685.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 683.
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court accepted a general claim for unjust enrichment as independent of
contract claims as well.
D.

Equitable Restitution

It is clear that Texas courts award both the common law and equitable
remedies of restitution. That is only proper, but using what are historically
common law sources to support remedies that were not seen in the common
law courts seems inappropriate and confusing. Of course, the Texas
Supreme Court could expand quasi-contract to support equitable remedies.
Unfortunately, this would continue the use of confusing terminology and
would distort legal history as well.
1.

Constructive Trust

In its 1948 decision in Pope v. Garrett, the Texas Supreme Court
upheld a judgment awarding a constructive trust against all of the heirs of
an intestate and covering all of the assets of her estate.'68 In Pope, the
defendants had received property through the descent and distribution
statute from the estate of Ms. Carrie Simons. Although Ms. Simons died
without leaving a will, she had clearly intended to execute a will giving all
of her estate to the plaintiff, Ms. Garrett. When she sought to sign her will,
two of her heirs caused such a disturbance that she was prevented from
executing the will. She fell seriously ill shortly thereafter and died. Some of
the defendants who as heirs took property from Ms. Simons' estate had not
participated in this disturbance and were innocent of any wrongdoing.' 6 9
Nevertheless, all of the heirs had received property from the estate as a
result of the wrongful action of the two heirs. Because Ms. Simons had
clearly intended to transfer all of her estate to Ms. Garrett by will, the heirs
were all enriched at Ms. Garrett's expense.170 The trial court impressed a
constructive trust on all of the assets of the estate, including those assets
held by the heirs innocent of any wrongdoing, but the court of appeals
reversed insofar as the constructive trust affected the property in the hands
of the innocent heirs.' 7 1
However, all of the defendants had benefited at the expense of Ms.
Garrett, and the Texas Supreme Court held that retention of these benefits,
even by the innocent heirs, would amount to unjust enrichment.1 72 In this

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. 1948).
Id. at 559-60.
See id.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 562.
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fashion, the Texas Supreme Court's decision was based on the satisfaction
of the three basic elements of a general unjust enrichment cause of action.
Restitution through the constructive trust effectively transferred the estate's
assets to the plaintiff because "[t]he policy against unjust enrichment argues
in favor of the judgment rendered herein."1 73 The trial court impressed the
constructive trust because "[b]ut for the wrongful acts [of two of the
defendants] the innocent defendants would not have inherited interests in

the property."l 74
The supreme court recognized that some courts denied such a plaintiff
any relief in tort against the innocent heirs because the plaintiff had no
existing right to the property but merely an expectancy interest. 175 Without
deciding the existence of this tort cause of action in Texas, the supreme
court approved the trial court's power as a court of equity to compel the
transfer of the estate to the intended legatee. 76 The supreme court
concluded that, though not guilty of tortious wrongdoing, the innocent
defendants had obtained a benefit at the expense of the plaintiff and that the
"policy against unjust enrichment" required the return of that benefit to the

plaintiff.17 7
More recently, the Texas Supreme Court stated in Meadows v.
Bierschwale that violation of a fiduciary relationship is not necessary to
support imposition of a constructive trust.178 Although the supreme court
noted that proof of actual fraud can justify a constructive trust, it cited with
approval the first Restatement of Restitution, which explains that a
constructive trust arises to remedy unjust enrichment and does not require
breach of a fiduciary relation.17 9
In Meadows, Oakes used fraud to induce Bierschwale to convey an
apartment complex in exchange for a series of notes that turned out to be
worthless. Before Bierschwale sued him, Oakes had sold the property at a
profit to a second buyer in exchange for promissory notes that were not
worthless. Bierschwale recovered a judgment against Oakes and obtained a
constructive trust on the promissory notes that Oakes received from the
second buyer. 1so
In the case before the Texas Supreme Court, Bierschwale's real estate
agent, Meadows, sought a share of the constructive trust imposed on those

173.
174.

Id.
See id.

175.

Id. at 561.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See id.
Id. at 562.
Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1974).
Id. (citing Restatement of Restitution § 160 cmt. a (1937)).
Id. at 127-28.
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promissory notes.' 8 Bierschwale had agreed to pay Meadows, his agent, a
percentage of the sales price, but that sale initially yielded a set of worthless
notes. 182 Bierschwale enjoyed a constructive trust on the second set of
promissory notes that did have value, but he wanted sole possession of the
proceeds from those notes.'83 If able to monopolize the constructive trust,
he would likely recover his sales price, including the portion he owed
Meadows as a commission. Although Meadows would presumably have
had the right to recover a judgment against Bierschwale, his recovery would
have been subject to the uncertainty and burden of enforcement. Giving
Bierschwale, but not Meadows, the property through a constructive trust
would thereby have tended to unjustly benefit the former at the expense of
the latter.
Unjust enrichment, rather than fraud or other wrongdoing, supported
the Texas Supreme Court's decision to give Meadows a share of the
constructive trust. The court made this clear in stating that "[c]onstructive
trusts, being remedial in character, have the very broad function of
redressing wrong or unjust enrichment."l 84 The court went further to say
that "there is no unyielding formula to which a court of equity is bound in
decreeing a constructive trust, since the equity of the transaction will shape
the measure of relief granted."' 85
2.

Subrogation

Subrogation refers to the law's permission for a plaintiff to assert the
rights originally belonging to a third party. Parties can agree to subrogation
in contracts, typically those involving insurance companies, and contract
law controls the application of this "conventional" subrogation. Equitable
subrogation applies to prevent unjust enrichment when no contract covers
the subject matter of the conflict.
Equitable subrogation can have two effects: it can substitute the
plaintiff for one who originally held the right to establish the defendant's
liability, or it can create in the plaintiff a security interest against specific
property of the defendant.18 6 The Restatement (Third) characterizes these
two effects of equitable subrogation as substantive and remedial. 87
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 131.
Id. at 127-28.
See id. at 131.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.

186. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 57 cmt. a
(2011) ("The word 'subrogation'-an antique synonym for 'substitution'-is commonly used to
describe both a liability and a remedy in restitution.").
187.

See id.
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The remedial effect of subrogation typically appears in cases in which
the defendant obtains money that rightfully belongs to the plaintiff, but uses
that money to pay off a secured debt on specific property. For example,
assume the defendant embezzled the plaintiff s money and used that money
to pay off the mortgage lien on her home and to obtain a release. If tracing
evidence supports this description of the facts, a judicial order can reinstate
the lien to cover the amount paid with the plaintiffs money and name the
plaintiff as the lienholder. This remedial form of equitable subrogation
provides the plaintiff restitution only after he satisfies the requirements of
liability-by proving unjust enrichment-and traces the benefit taken by
the defendant to the release of the lien.
If the plaintiff could only prove a claim for unjust enrichment but
could not trace his money to the removal of the lien, he could nevertheless
obtain restitution in the form of a monetary judgment. A monetary
judgment gives him no priority over other creditors who may be competing
for the assets of the defendant. If the plaintiff can prove the unjust
enrichment claim and satisfy the requirement for tracing, equitable
subrogation allows him to enjoy the priority of a lien for the same amount
of money and thus gives him priority over unsecured creditors.188
Equitable subrogation's substantive effect gives the plaintiff standing
to assert a right of action the law originally lodged with a third party. This
effect resembles a contractual assignment of a right of action, but allows
substitution in the absence of a contract. The law creates this extracontractual substitution of the plaintiff for the third party in order to prevent
the defendant's unjust enrichment.
For example, in Frymire Engineering Co. v. Jomar International,Ltd.,
the Texas Supreme Court used equitable subrogation to establish the
plaintiffs standing to assert the rights of the entity whose property was
damaged. 189 In Frymire, the Renaissance Hotel in Dallas had employed a
general contractor to remodel one of its meeting rooms. Frymire contracted
with the general contractor to do part of that work. In its contract with the
general contractor, Frymire agreed to pay for any damages that its work
caused the hotel or the general contractor and to cover this obligation with
liability insurance. In completing its work on the hotel's air conditioning
system, Frymire installed a valve manufactured by Jomar. A leak in the air
conditioning water line at the location of the valve caused extensive damage

188. See id. This remedial form of equitable subrogation is "closely analogous to the
operation of constructive trust (§ 55) or equitable lien (§ 56), but ... [i]nstead of an acquisition of
property . . . at the claimant's expense, . . . the claimant's assets have been used to satisfy an

obligation of the defendant." Id.
189. Frymire Eng'g Co. v. Jomar Int'l, Ltd., 259 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. 2008).
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to the hotel. 190 Upon demand by the hotel, Frymire's insurer, Liberty
Mutual, paid the hotel $458,496 on Frymire's behalf. In exchange for this
payment, the hotel released Frymire and Liberty Mutual from all claims
arising from this damage.19 1
Frymire and Liberty Mutual then sued Jomar alleging its valve was
defective. However, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Jomar, and the court of appeals affirmed this judgment based on its
conclusion that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert what the court
deemed were rights belonging to the hotel.19 2 The court of appeals held that
Frymire failed to satisfy the requirements of equitable subrogation and thus
could not obtain standing by substituting for the hotel.193
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that
equitable subrogation applied to give Frymire standing to assert the hotel's
claims against Jomar.194 In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court
stated that Frymire should have a trial because the evidence supported its
"contentions that it (1) paid a debt primarily owed by Jomar, (2) did so
involuntarily, and (3) seeks subrogation in a situation where Jomar would
be unjustly enriched if Frymire were precluded from pursuing its claims."' 95
Here, the immediate remedy sought was equitable subrogation, and the
supreme court granted that remedy to prevent the unjust enrichment of
Jomar at the expense of Frymire. The supreme court gave Frymire standing
because it had paid off a claim that was primarily the obligation of Jomar.19 6
If Jomar had been allowed to avoid Frymire's claim for money paid to the
hotel (allegedly to cover damages caused by Jomar's defective product),
Jomar would have been unjustly enriched. These characteristics track the
three elements of a general unjust enrichment claim with the addition of a
requirement that Frymire must not have voluntarily made the payment.
The Texas Supreme Court stated in its earlier decision in Smart v.
Tower Land & Investment Co., that:
Equitable subrogation may be invoked ... when one person confers
upon another a benefit that is not required by legal duty or contract
the
debt
of
one
person
pays
[such
as
when
another].... Subrogation ... is available, however, only when the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id.
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debtor was enriched unjustly; thus, the payor who confers a benefit as
a "mere volunteer" is not entitled to this remedy. 97
In general, restitution will not lie "for an unrequested benefit voluntarily
conferred."' 9 8 The subrogation requirement that the plaintiff acted
involuntarily merely expresses a fundamental limiting principle on unjust
enrichment claims.' 99 Frymire's contract with the general contractor
obligated it to pay any damages its work caused the hotel, and though entry
into this contract may have been voluntary, Frymire's "duty to honor that
contract was not." 200 Furthermore, given "the evidentiary presumption that
Jomar's faulty product primarily caused the water damage, [the court had]
no trouble concluding that Jomar would be unjustly enriched were Frymire
not permitted to pursue its claims." 20 1
3.

Rescission and Reformation

The Texas Supreme Court has also recognized the equitable nature of
the remedy of rescission.2 02 Rescission allows a court to set aside a contract
because of mutual mistake or wrongdoing, and restitution comes into play
when it would be unjust to allow one party to retain any benefit gained
before rescission. 20 3 In addition to rescission, courts can reform a document
that was mistakenly drafted. For example, in a 1916 decision, the Texas
Supreme Court reformed a document that erroneously stated that a debtor
had fully paid the note held by his bank.204 If enforced, such mistakes can
unjustifiably enrich a party to the agreement or a third party, and
reformation operates to prevent that unjust enrichment.
In Myrad Properties,Inc. v. LaSalle Bank National Ass'n, Myrad had
obtained financing from LaSalle's predecessor in interest for two separate
properties in the total amount of $1.05 million.205 An apartment complex
was located on each of the two properties, and the deed of trust covered
both tracts with improvements. Myrad defaulted on the loan, and LaSalle

197.

Smart v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 597 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex. 1980).

198.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§

2(3) (2011); see

also id. § 2 cmt. d ("Instead of proposing a bargain, the restitution claimant first confers a benefit,
then seeks payment for its value.").
199.
See id. § 2(3) ("There is no liability in restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily
conferred, unless the circumstances of the transaction justify the claimant's intervention in the
absence of contract.").

200.
201.

Frymire, 259 S.W.3d at 146.
Id.

202.
203.
204.
205.

See Smith v. Nat'l Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. 1979).
See id.; I DOBBS, supra note 7, §4.3(6), at 614-15.
See First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 183 S.W. 874, 876-77 (Tex. 1916).
Myrad Props., Inc. v. LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 300 S.W.3d 746, 748 (Tex. 2009).
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proceeded with foreclosure. Through oversight, the notice of foreclosure
referred to an Exhibit A, which described only one of the properties. 206
At the foreclosure sale, the trustees referred generally to the properties
described in the deed of trust, and LaSalle made the sole bid at auction of
$978,000.00 for the two properties.2 07 However, the trustees' deed
conveyed to LaSalle only that property described in the Exhibit A that was
attached to the notice of foreclosure.20 8 After the parties discovered this
mistake, the trustees substituted a corrected deed transferring both
properties for the erroneous deed that transferred only one. Myrad sued to
restrain LaSalle from filing the corrected deed, but the district court
ultimately allowed the correction. The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment holding that the corrected deed validly gave LaSalle title to both

properties.209

The Texas Supreme Court held, however, that the correction deed was
void as a matter of law because this device could be used only for
correcting some facial imperfection in the title.210 In this case, the correction
deed included an additional, separate parcel of land.2 11 Nevertheless, the
supreme court held that "[r]escission is an available equitable remedy if
mutual mistake is shown." 212 It also noted that Myrad's position-that the
erroneous deed must stand as the sole transfer-would result in Myrad's
unjust enrichment.2 13 That position would result either in requiring LaSalle
(or some other buyer) to pay another sum for the second property, giving
Myrad a windfall from the surplus, or leaving Myrad the owner of the
second parcel even though it had defaulted on its note.214 The supreme court
therefore concluded that "Myrad [would] be unjustly enriched if the
mistaken deed to LaSalle is enforced." 2 15 Since this was the case, the court

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 750-51.
Id.
Id. at 751.

213.

Id. at 752-53.

214. See id. at 752. The Texas Supreme Court's reasoning in Myrad followed the rule stated
in § 12 of the Restatement (Third). Section 12 does not specify the remedy that should be used to
avoid unjust enrichment, but the typical remedy would be reformation. In Myrad, the Texas
Supreme Court spoke of rescission, assuming that once the erroneous deed was removed from
effect the trustees would substitute one that followed the agreement of the parties. In both
instances, restitution prevents or reverses some party's unjust enrichment but does so by giving
"effect to the real agreement of the parties." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
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stated that "[t]o avoid an unjust enrichment, we rule in favor of LaSalle and
render judgment on its claim for rescission."2 16
VI. CONCLUSION
The Texas Supreme Court rulings on restitution describe a generally
applicable cause of action that the court most frequently identifies as one
aimed at preventing unjust enrichment. This cause of action supports both
the equitable and common law remedies in restitution. The quasi-contract
cause of action identified by some lower Texas courts cannot, without
stumbling over its own history, authorize equitable restitution. The Texas
Supreme Court rulings also tend to label as unjust enrichment a general
cause of action that is independent of tort or contract claims. Although the
evidence is as yet unclear, the supreme court also seems to be moving away
from an insistence on the use of the special unjust enrichment claims of
money had and received and quantum meruit.
These actions by the Texas Supreme Court have created a foundation
for clarification of its unjust enrichment cause of action. That clarification
should begin with an authoritative statement describing the elements of the
cause of action and the breadth of its application. The court acted
emphatically in its forceful statements in Elledge when it insisted on the
application of the two-year statute of limitations to unjust enrichment
claims. That same emphatic action may be necessary to clear away the
controversy in this area.
Those steps by the Texas Supreme Court will necessarily diminish the
significance of the confusing terms born in the late Middle Ages to cloak
the creation of a substantive right against unjust enrichment. Texas courts
do not need the linguistic cover provided by quasi-contract terminology,
and the law is better served by allowing judges and litigants to confront the
problem of unjust enrichment directly. Speaking of liability in terms of
unjust enrichment directs the reader to one of the core concepts of the law
of restitution. Making such concepts more understandable will not solve
every difficulty. Hard cases will still occur, but they will be difficult
because of their merits, not because we do not understand our own terms.
Using language that refers only to obsolete procedural forms, or to fictional
justifications for expanding the jurisdiction of ancient courts, makes even

216.

Id. In First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, the Texas Supreme Court reformed a

release of lien in which the bank erroneously recited the full payment of the note it held and
cancelled its lien on a 103-acre tract. The bank intended, on the basis of a partial payment, to
release its lien only as it was binding on other, smaller tracts. The supreme court concluded that
"equity would reform the release so as to correct the mistake and speak the truth." See First State
Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 183 S.W. 874, 875-77 (Tex. 1916).
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easy cases harder and has no legitimate purpose. It is merely habit, and it is
a bad one.

